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Federal Tort Claims Act - Federal Law Determines the
Date Upon Which the Period of Limitations Begins To Run
Plaintiff brought a malpractice action against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act' for the negligent treatment of
Plaintiff's wife at an Air Force hospital. An erroneous blood trans-
fusion was administered on May 17, 1956, but Plaintiff and his wife
did not learn of the error until June, 1959. Suit was filed on August
29, 1960. The United States pleaded that the two-year period of
limitations contained in the Tort Claims Act' had run because, under
the law of the state of Washington where the alleged negligent act
occurred, Plaintiff's "claim accrued" when the blood transfusion was
administered on May 17, 1956. Plaintiff argued that state law was
applicable only to define the actionable wrong; that federal law de-
termined when a "claim accrued" to start the period of limitations;
and that under federal law the "claim accrued" when the injury
was discovered. The district court granted the government's motion
to dismiss on the ground that the suit was filed more than two years
after the "claim accrued" and was, therefore, barred under section
2401 (b) of the Tort Claims Act. Held, reversed: Under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, state law determines only whether a substantive
right of action exists against the United States; federal law governs
when the "claim accrues" for purposes of the Act's two-year period
of limitations. Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.
1962). The principal case conflicts with Tessier v. United States,'
in which the First Circuit held that state law controls when a "claim
accrues" under the Tort Claims Act. Subsequent to the conflict be-
tween the First and Fifth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit, in Hungerford
v. United States, adopted the reasoning of the Fifth.
The conflicting interpretations were caused by the ambiguous
wording of the Tort Claims Act which purports to make the United
States liable as a "private person."' The Quinton and Hungerford
' Provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act are found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346,
1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1958), hereafter referred to as
sections of the "Tort Claims Act."
2 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1958) provides: "A tort claim against the United States shall
be forever barred unless action is begun within two years after such claim accrues or
within one year after the date of enactment of this amendatory sentence, whichever is
later ......
a 2 6 9 F.2d 305 (Ist Cir. 1959).
4 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962).
'28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958) provides:
[T]he district courts .. . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
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cases held that although this provision adopts the state law to define
the existence of an actionable federal wrong, Congress chose to utilize
a federal period of limitations, and, therefore, federal law controls
the starting of the period of limitations. The court, in Tessier, held
that the provision adopts the substantive law of the state, and it
also adopts state law to govern when the "claim accrues" under the
Act.
Contrary to other federal statutes, the Tort Claims Act does not
define the acts or omissions which constitute the basis of a suit under
it. Instead, it adopts the substantive law of the various states, except
in specified instances," to determine if a tort has been committed by
the United States.' Some courts consider the Act to be a mere "waiver
of governmental immunity" since it does not define the substantive
wrongs for which suit is permitted.! However, others have concluded
that the Act creates a federal substantive right of action against the
United States The latter view is superior because, until the enact-
ment of the Tort Claims Act, no right of action against the United
States existed at common law.'
In Maryland v. United States,"' one of the early cases involving the
Tort Claims Act, the Fourth Circuit stated that courts should not
apply state law so as to circumvent the intent and purpose of
Congress. The court refused to allow a state statute of limitations to
control the period of limitations under the Federal Act. The relevant
Maryland one-year period of limitations is a condition precedent to
the right to sue and not merely a restriction on the remedy." There-
claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after
January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred. (Emphasis added.)
628 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1958): defines a federal period of limitations; § 2402 (1958):
does away with trial by jury; § 2674 (1958): disallows interest prior to judgment; $ 2674
(1958): disallows punitive damages.
728 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1958).
'United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951); Lloyds' London v. Blair,
262 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1958); Glasspool v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 804 (D. Del.
1961); see also Heuser, Dalhite v. United States: A New Approach To The Federal Tort
Claims Act, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 175 (1954).
'Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); Young v. United States,
184 F.2d 587 (D.C. App. 1950); Bates v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 57 (D. Neb. 1948).
"°Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30 (1953); Commissioners of the State Ins.
Fund v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 549, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
" 165 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947).
"Stasciewicz v. Parks, 148 Md. 477, 129 Atl. 793 (1925). The other view, as
exemplified by Texas, is that a statute of limitations affects only the remedy, and, therefore,
it must be pleaded or it is waived. Edwards Mfg. Co. v. Southern Sur. Co., 283 S.W. 624
(Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Chapman v. Mooney, 257 S.W. 1106 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
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fore, under Maryland law, the government would not have been
liable as a "private person" because the year had elapsed and a right
to sue no longer existed. However, in holding the United States
liable to suit, the Fourth Circuit stated:
We think, however, the purpose and effect of the language of the
statute is that we shall look to the law of the state for the purpose of
defining the actionable wrong for which liability shall exist on the part
of the United States, but to the act itself for the limitations of time
within which action shall be instituted to enforce the liability.'" (Em-
phasis added.)
Thus, the court held that even if the state period of limitations
conditions a right and denies the existence of a cause of action, the
federal period of limitations must control.
Three cases have been decided by the courts concerning whether
federal or state law controls when a "claim accrues" and when the
period of limitations begins to run under the Tort Claims Act. 4 All
three held that federal law controls.
In Foote v. Public Housing Comm'r," a federal district court held
that the Tort Claims Act period of limitations starts running upon
a decedent's death and not, as under applicable Michigan law, upon
appointment of an administrator. The court turned to other federal
acts8 to determine the applicable federal rule on the ground that
to follow state law for starting the period of limitations would per-
mit circumvention of the federal period.
Two years later, in Bizer v. United States," a district court held
that federal law controls when a "claim accrues" under the Tort
Claims Act. The defendant, United States, contended that federal
law and not California law controlled when the period of limitations
began to run." Under California law, a cause of action arises at the
time of the injury, but the California period of limitations does not
begin to run until the person has knowledge of his injury. In accept-
ing the government's contention that federal law controls, the court
said:
Thus the state law does control when the Tort Claims limitation be-
13 165 F.2d 869, 871 (4th Cir. 1949).
14United States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1958); Bizer v. United States, 124 F.
Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Foote v. Public Housing Comm'r, 107 F. Supp. 270 (W.D.
Mich. 1952).
a" Foote v. Public Housing Comm'r, supra note 14.
"8Federal Employers' Liability Act, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958);
Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 741-52 (1958).
17124 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
18 Significantly, the United States was successful in Bizer in contending that federal
law controlled, but in the principal case, the government took the opposite position and
was unsuccessful in contending state law controlled.
1963 ]
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gins to run in one very important sense. There must be in existence a
state cause of action before the statute has anything to run on, or
if you will, before the "claim accrues." State law governs the existence
of the cause of action. But this is quite a different thing from the date
from which the state statute begins to run. . . .I hold that the state
law governs when the cause of action comes into existence but the
federal law governs when the Tort Claims limitation begins to run."'
(Emphasis added.)
The court recognized that under the Act a "cause of action" and a
"claim" are not interchangeable and that the former is determined
by state law and the latter by federal law. However, under the
particular facts in the Bizer case, the court decided that the cause of
action arose and the claim accrued at the same time.2 The important
issue decided was that federal law controls when a "claim accrues."
Similarly, in Jackson v. United States,"s the court said: "Federal law
governs the construction of the statute, including the meaning of the
quoted language [referring to section 2401 (b) of the Tort Claims
Act, 'two years after such claim accrues']; state law governs what
acts or omissions are negligent or wrongful and when the cause of
action comes into existence." 2
The confusing state substantive law applied and the unclear
language used in the 195 8 case of United States v. Reid3 contributed
to the conflict between the Fifth 4 and Ninth" Circuits on one side
and the First Circuit" on the other. In Reid, the negligent act oc-
curred on March 10, 1949, but was not discovered until February
16, 1950, with the onset of pains. Suit was filed on November 29,
19 51. The Fifth Circuit held that the suit was filed within the two-
year period of limitations contained in the Tort Claims Act for two
alternative reasons. Consequently, the Reid case must be read care-
fully to determine which reason the court was supporting at the time.
Under Georgia substantive law, which the Tort Claims Act adopts
'9 124 F. Supp. 949, 952 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
20 In the Bizer case, the plaintiff suffered a traumatic injury at the time of the negligent
act. This accounts for the result that the "cause of action" and "claim accrual" coincided,
as distinguished from the federal rule enunciated by the Quinton case. In fact, the court said:
I need not hold, and do not hold, that in every malpractice case under the
Tort Claims Act, the period of limitations begins to run on the date of injury.
Here the injury was caused while plaintiff was conscious; the injury was
traumatic; plaintiff knew that he was injured, he was told the examination had
burst his bladder, and he knew that this had not happened in a previous
examination of a similar type. 124 F. Supp. at 953. (Emphasis added.)
21 182 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1960).
2 ld. at 911.
23 251 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1958).
4 Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962).
2' Hungerford v. United States, 307 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962).
" Tessier v. United States, 269 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959).
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to define the actionable wrong, a cause of action arises only when the
damage has been sustained. In order to ascertain when the damage
occurred, the court had to find a point in time between March 10,
1949, when the negligent act occurred, and February 16, 195 0, when
the plaintiff learned of his injury with the onset of pains. The court
inferred that no damage occurred until within two years of filing
suit, and thus the substantive actionable wrong was not committed
until then."
However, the Fifth Circuit, in Reid, did not stop with finding that
the suit was timely filed on the ground that under Georgia law the
substantive actionable wrong was committed within two years
prior to filing suit. As its alternative reason, the court held that the
federal rule, as expressed in Urie v. Thompson,2' was applicable and
that the "claim accrued" when the plaintiff had knowledge of the
injury on February 16, 1950. If the court had only applied state law,
then, of course, the federal rule would have been inapplicable. How-
ever, it is clear that the court considered the Urie rule controlling
and that when the period began to run was a federal question. This
is evidenced from the language used in a footnote, which reads:
"[I]t is the state law which determines when, if ever, a claim comes
into being. But once it does the time in which the F.T.C.A. suit must
be filed is controlled by the Federal Act.""
After the Reid opinion had been written, Tessier v. United States'
was decided by the First Circuit. Under Massachusetts law, the
cause of action for medical malpractice arises at the time of the
"
7 Barrett v. Jackson, 44 Ga. App. 611, 162 S.E. 308, 309 (1932).
"The court stated:
Assuming that Reid, as the plaintiff, had the burden of bringing himself
within the time period qualifying the right . . . we think that the evidence
satisfactorily established it, at least prima facie, so that it was then up to the
Government to rebut it. Since the Trial Court was acutely aware of the sig-
nificance of limitations, his express holding of a timely suit is without doubt
an implied crediting of persuasive evidence that from March 10, 1949 down
to the time just a few weeks before February 16, 1950, no perceptible change
had occurred. . . . The inference that the adverse effects first began to make
inroads on his body [damage] after November 28, 1949, [two years before
action was filed] certainly has as much record support as one that it mnust
necessarily have occurred between March 10 and November 29, 1949. 251
F.2d at 695.
29337 U.S. 163 (1949). In Urie, the Supreme Court held that the period of limitations
contained in the Federal Employers' Liability Act does not begin to run until the injured
party knows or has reason to know of his injury in certain classes of nontraumatic injuries.
30 251 F.2d at 694 n.4.
3' 269 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959). Tessier had an almost identical fact situation with
the Quinton case. Government doctors negligently left two metallic needle fragments between
the plaintiff's diaphragm and liver which subsequently caused an abscess. The negligent act
occurred in June, 1947, but the damage was not discovered until March, 1954.
1963 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
negligent act, and the period of limitations begins to run at that
time. The court held that state, not federal, law controls for three
reasons. First, the court held that the federal rule as expressed in
Urie v. Thompson" was inapplicable since the Urie case concerned
the Federal Employer's Liability Act," which creates a federal sub-
stantive right as distinguished from the Tort Claims Act which only
"waives governmental immunity." 4 Secondly, the court cited Bizer
v. United States"' for the proposition that a "claim accrues" when
a similarly situated private person would become liable to suit under
the law of the state. Thirdly, the court cited the Reid case as holding
that the state law controls when the period of limitations begins to
36
run.
The principal case appears to be a reaffirmation of the principles
expressed in the early cases under the Tort Claims Act, i.e., Congress,
in creating a federal substantive right of action against the United
States, chose to delineate in that Act the time within which the suit
must be brought, and this should not be circumvented by state law.
The purpose and intent of Congress in creating a federal period of
limitations was to create uniformity throughout the federal system.
Consequently, if state law is permitted to either broaden or constrict
the time within which suit must be brought by controlling when
the period starts to run, then the uniformity Congress intended can
be circumvented.
Furthermore, Congress has decided for reasons of policy that the
period 'for bringing suit shall be within two years after a "claim
accrues." Thus, the time when a "claim accrues" should be a federal
question in order to effectuate the federal policy. Clearly, if the
policy of state X is to start the period of limitations upon occurrence
of the act and then to provide for a lengthy period of limitations, and
state Y chooses to start its period of limitations upon knowledge of
damage and to use a shorter period of limitations, then to apply the
individual state's starting point but not its period of limitations would
frustrate the federal, as well as state, policy.
Judge Hutcheson, in his concurring opinion in the principal case,"7
significantly pointed out that if a period of limitations is contained
in an act which creates a new liability, then the period limits the right
created. 8 In other words, the period of limitations is not remedial, as
32337 U.S. 163 (1949); see note 29 supra.
3353 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1958).
" See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
35 124 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1954); see notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
36 251 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1958); see notes 23-30 supra and accompanying text.
' 304 F.2d at 241.
38 Id. at 242; see also Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904).
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in the general statute of limitations, but creates a limitation on the
substantive right." Moreover, it has been held that a statute which
creates a time limit within which to sue the United States should be
interpreted restrictively." If suit is not brought within the stated
period, the court no longer has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
claim.4' Although courts, in dictum, have often referred to section
2401 (b) as a statute of limitations, when forced to distinguish be-
tween the two, they have held that the section is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to the right of suit." Thus, once the period of limitations
is recognized as a federal jurisdictional requirement, it is evident
that it should be controlled by federal and not state law. Further,
since it is not a statute of limitations which affects only the remedy
and which can be waived, state decisions and policy concerning state
statutes of limitations are inapplicable.
It is submitted that the Fifth Circuit correctly decided in Quinton
v. United States that federal law controls the starting of the period
of limitations. The holding effectuates the uniformity which Con-
gress intended. The clear language employed by the court should
prevent fuzzy thinking by many federal courts long accustomed to
applying state substantive law in cases involving state-created rights
in accordance with Erie R.R. v. Tompkins." The Quinton case
follows the earlier cases" which held that section 1346,45 in making
the government liable as a "private person," adopts the state law
only to define the actionable wrong, but does not adopt the state
statute of limitations. Thus, section 1346 does not limit the federal
period of limitations contained in section 2401 (b)."
The Quinton case is in line with a recent Supreme Court decision
which also concerns the Tort Claims Act. In Richards v. United
States,7 the Court stated: "[I]t seems sufficient to note that Congress
has been specific in those instances where it intended the federal
courts to depart completely from state law."'4' (Emphasis added.)
a See Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38 (1926); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Burnette, 239 U.S. 199, 201 (1915). See also note 12 supra and accompanying text.
40United States v. Wardwell, 172 U.S. 48 (1898).
41 Ibid.
"'Simon v. United States, 244 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1957); Foote v. Public Housing
Comm'r, 107 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
43304 U.S. 64 (1938). This rule essentially requires federal courts, when deciding cases
upon state created rights, to apply the local substantive law of the state in which the
court sits.
44 Maryland v. Burkhardt, 165 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1949); Jackson v. United States,
182 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1960); Bizer v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal.
1954); Foote v. Public Housing Comm'r, 107 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
'3 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958). See note 5 supra for text of the statute.
4628 U.S.C. S 2401(b) (1958). See note 2 supra for text of the statute.
47 369 U.S. 1 (1962), noted in 17 Sw. L.J. 303 (1963).
48 369 U.S. at 14.
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The Court cited section 2401 (b), the Tort Claims Act's period of
limitations, as an example.
The decision of Tessier v. United States'9 appears incorrect. The
three reasons given for the result do not withstand careful analysis.
First, the Tort Claims Act does create a federal substantive right
of action and does not merely waive governmental immunity."° Sec-
ondly, the Bizer case did not hold that in every instance in which a
cause of action arises under state law a claim will likewise "accrue"
under the Federal Act."' Thirdly, the Reid case did not hold that
state law controls when a "claim accrues," but held that federal law
controls." In fact, the Reid opinion adopted the federal rule ex-
pressed in Urie v. Thompson.3 The Tessier case is without firm basis
and should not be followed.
Future cases which consider the federal period of limitations con-
tained in the Tort Claims Act should recognize that one of the
problems created by sections 1346" and 2401 (b)" is semantic. It
is important to distinguish between a "cause of action" and the
"accrual of a claim" and to realize that they are not interchangeable,
although in the majority of cases they will coincide in point of time.
A cause of action arises only under state law and is suable in a state
court. However, only a claim is the subject of suit under the federal
substantive right created by the Tort Claims Act. Nevertheless, a
state cause of action is important under the Tort Claims Act since a
completed cause of action is necessary for an actionable wrong to
have been committed by the government. Since in many cases the
"cause of action" and the "claim" arise at the same point in time,
the courts will often use the terms interchangeably. In other words,
the courts speak of a cause of action arising under the Tort Claims
Act which seems as if state law is applied to determine when the
period of limitations begins to run, although in fact a claim accrued at
the same time under federal law. Because of this loose language in
court opinions, it is dangerous to rely upon the courts' exact choice
of words. For example, in a normal case involving a traumatic in-
jury when the negligent act is committed, a cause of action will arise
under state law, and a claim will accrue under the federal rule. How-
ever, if the "cause of action" and the "claim accrual" are not
4"269 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1959).
50 See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
51 See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
52 See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
59 337 U.S. 163 (1949); see note 29 supra.5428 U.S.C. S 1346 (1958); see note 5 supra.
5a2 8 U.S.C. 5 2401(b) (1958); see note 2 supra.
[Vol. 17
